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Institute Examination in Law
By Spencer Gordon
[The following answers to the questions set by the board of examiners of the 
American Institute of Accountants at the examinations of November, 1929, 
have been prepared at the request of The Journal of Accountancy. These 
answers have not been reviewed by the board of examiners and are in no way 
official. They represent merely the personal opinions of the author.—Editor, 
The Journal of Accountancy.]
EXAMINATION IN COMMERCIAL LAW
November 15, 1929, 9 a.m. to 12:30 p.m.
group I
Answer all the questions in this group.
No. 1
Define and explain the following terms or expressions relative to contracts: 
special damages, liquidated damages, legal tender, substantial performance.
Answer:
(a) Special damages for breach of contract are those which may not be 
anticipated from an inspection of the contract. They are recoverable only if 
the party breaking the contract knew of the special circumstances which might 
cause such damage.
(b) Liquidated damages are those which have been made certain in amount.
(c) Legal tender is that currency which by act of congress is made a suf­
ficient means of payment of any debt, and which, when offered in payment, con­
stitutes a tender.
(d) Substantial performance is that degree of bona-fide performance, short 
of complete performance, which a court will deem a compliance with all the im­
portant requirements of a contract.
No. 2
Lamb & Son were engaged in business under the name of Alpha Paper Works. 
They became insolvent. They entered into an agreement, in the nature of a 
deed of trust, with their creditors under which certain creditors, as trustees, 
were to carry on the business under the name Alpha Paper Company, to divide 
the profits among the creditors pro rata, and when all were paid to return the 
business to the original proprietors. The trustees, as such, gave a note to one 
Reim, who, upon non-payment of the note, sued the creditors alleging them to 
be partners in the conduct of Alpha Paper Company. What should be the 
decision?
Answer:
The deed of trust here given appears to be in the nature of an assignment for 
benefit of creditors, and in such an assignment there is no objection to carrying 
on the business if all creditors of the assignor assent. A trust is created, and 
the creditors become beneficiaries or cestui que trustent. All debts con­
tracted in running the business after the creation of the trust become obligations 
of the trust and also personal obligations of the trustees—in the absence of 
contractual limitations on their personal liability—but the creditors are in 
no sense partners, and cannot be made liable as such. (Where the trust has 
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become insolvent, trust funds paid the creditors may be followed into their 
hands by the creditors of the trust, but recovery can be had only to the extent 
of such funds.)
No. 3
While touring during the past summer an accident occurred in which your 
automobile was so damaged that it was a total loss except for salvage of a 
small amount for tires and a few accessories. Can you deduct your loss in 
your federal income-tax return for the year 1929?
Answer:
The loss may be deducted in the taxpayers’ federal income-tax return for 
the year 1929. Article 171 of regulations 74, which are the regulations inter­
preting the 1928 act, provides as follows:
“ A loss occasioned by damage to an automobile maintained for pleasure, 
where such damage results from the faulty driving of the taxpayer or other 
person operating the automobile, but is not due to the willful act or willful 
negligence of the taxpayer, is a deductible loss in the computation of net 
income. Where damage to a taxpayer’s automobile results from the 
faulty driving of the operator of an automobile with which the automobile 
of the taxpayer collides, the loss occasioned to the taxpayer by such 
damage is likewise deductible.”
No. 4
You are elected a director of a corporation which has issued six per cent 
preferred stock and also common stock. What information, other than the 
fact that there were earnings available, would you deem it necessary to have in 
order to enable you to vote properly on a resolution to declare a dividend on the 
common stock?
Answer:
The director must know that there is a sufficient surplus to cover the pro­
posed dividends on the common stock, after payment of six per cent on the 
preferred stock, and after payment of all back dividends on the preferred stock 
if it is cumulative.
No. 5
Define a negotiable instrument. Name and explain the two characteristics 
which distinguish a negotiable instrument from an ordinary contract.
Answer:
A negotiable instrument is a written unconditional promise, or order on a 
designated person, signed by the maker or drawer, to pay a certain sum in 
money on demand or at a fixed or determinable future time to order or bearer. 
The promise in a negotiable instrument can only be to pay money; whereas 
the promise in a simple contract can be to do other things. The equitable 
defenses of a party to a negotiable instrument are cut off by negotiation into 
the hands of a holder in due course; whereas, equitable defenses on a simple 
contract, which is only assignable as distinguished from negotiable, are not 
cut off by the assignment.
GROUP II
Answer any five (5) of the following questions but no more than five:
No. 6
Jones, on an automobile trip from New York to Boston, agreed to take a 
valuable parcel for his friend Smith and to deliver it to Smith’s son in Provi­
dence. Jones stopped in Bridgeport for dinner. He took his own property 
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out of the car at the hotel, but Smith’s parcel, which was left in the car, was 
stolen while the car was parked. Discuss the principles involved.
Answer:
One receiving goods from the owner for the purpose of caring for them or 
transporting them is a bailee of such goods. His duty with regard to them and 
the degree of care he is required to exercise depend upon the circumstances of 
the bailment. Jones was a gratuitous bailee. As such he was not an insurer 
of the goods, nor was he held to any high standard of care regarding them. He 
was, however, bound to exercise as reasonably high a degree of care over the 
bailed goods as he might reasonably be expected to exercise over his own, 
particularly in view of the fact that he was aware that the goods were valuable. 
He removed his own property from the car, but neglected to remove Smith’s 
parcel. It would seem that he had failed to exercise the requisite degree of 
care over Smith’s parcel, and that he would be liable for its value when lost. 
It has been said that a gratuitous bailee is liable only for goods lost through his 
own gross negligence, but it seems preferable to express his liability in terms 
of the degree of care required in the circumstances.
No. 7
Detroit, Mich., July 5, 1929.
Sixty days after date I promise to pay to the order of O. R. King six hundred 
dollars at the Citizens’ National Bank, Detroit, Michigan. Value received.
Frederick Thompson, 
By James Thompson, 
Attorney-in-fact.
Actually James Thompson had no authority from Frederick Thompson to 
execute the above note. From whom can a holder in due course recover?
Answer:
Section 39 of the negotiable-instruments law makes one who has signed a 
principal’s name without authority liable on the note. A holder in due course, 
therefore, can recover from James Thompson, and, by sections 115 and 116, 
from any unqualified endorser. Frederick Thompson is not liable.
No. 8
Burns and Sanford are partners, conducting a profitable business. Sanford, 
however, is so much of a spendthrift that he falls deeply in debt and is forced 
into bankruptcy by his creditors. What effect, if any, does this have on the 
partnership?
Answer:
The liability of the partnership is fixed by section 5 (h) of the United States 
bankruptcy law, which provides that “in the event of one or more but not all 
of the members of a partnership being adjudged bankrupt, the partnership 
property shall not be administered in bankruptcy, unless by consent of the 
partner or partners not adjudged bankrupt, but such partner or partners not 
adjudged bankrupt shall settle the partnership business as expeditiously as 
its nature will permit and account for the interest of the partner or partners 
adjudged bankrupt.”
No. 9
Knapp became an accommodation endorser on a note made by Styles. 
When the note matured Styles failed to pay and it was paid by Knapp. Knapp 
sued Styles on the note for the amount due. Styles set up the technical de­
fense that the note was discharged by Knapp’s payment and that therefore no 
suit could be based on it. Was he correct?
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Answer:
Section 202 of the negotiable instruments law provides: “When the instru­
ment is paid by a party secondarily liable thereon, it is not discharged; but the 
party so paying it is remitted to his former rights as regards all prior par­
ties ...” Interpreting this section with regard to accommodation endorsers, 
some courts hold that such endorsers have no “prior rights” to which they may 
be remitted, on the theory that they were never endorsees or payees, and 
therefore consider the note as discharged, but even these courts allow recovery 
by the endorser on an implied contract of suretyship. Other courts consider 
the “former rights” clause not applicable to accommodation endorsers and 
allow recovery on the note itself.
No. 10
In 1921 A purchased real estate for the sum of $20,000. In 1929 he made an 
exchange with B, receiving another parcel of property, having a value of $25,- 
000, and $5,000 in cash. What was A’s taxable income from the transaction? 
Answer:
Assuming that A purchased the real estate in question for investment and 
assuming he was not a real-estate dealer, his taxable income from the transac­
tion would not exceed $5,000 in cash. Article 572 of regulations 74 provides:
“ In the following cases no gain or loss is recognized:
“ (a) If property held for productive use in trade or business or for in­
vestment (not including stock in trade or other property held primarily 
for sale, nor stocks, bonds, notes, choses in action, certificates of trust or 
beneficial interest, or other securities or evidences of indebtedness or 
interest) is exchanged solely for property of a like kind to be held either for 
productive use in trade or business or for investment. . . . Unproductive 
real estate held by one other than a dealer for future use or future realiza­
tion of the increment in value is held for investment and not primarily for 
sale.”
Article 573 of regulations 74 provides as follows:
“ Exchanges of property for other property and money.—If an exchange 
would fall within the provisions of article 572 but for the fact that the 
property received in exchange consists not only of property permitted by 
that article to be received without the recognition of gain, but also of other 
property or money, the gain, if any, to the recipient shall be recognized, 
but in an amount not in excess of the sum of the money and the fair market 
value of the other property. No loss from such an exchange will be recog­
nized. (See section 122 (e).)
“Example: A in 1928 exchanged real estate which he had purchased in 
1917 for $5,000 for other real estate having a fair market value of $6,000 
and $2,000 in cash. The gain from the transaction, that is, $3,000, is 
recognized only to the extent of $2,000, the amount which was received in 
cash. A’s taxable income from the exchange is, therefore, $2,000. See 
article 597 for the basis for determining gain or loss from a subsequent 
sale.”
No. 11
What income-tax cases may be appealed to the board of tax appeals and 
when must such appeal be taken?
Answer:
Income-tax cases for years subsequent to 1915 in which the commissioner of 
internal revenue has determined a deficiency in taxes may be appealed to the 
board of tax appeals. Such appeals must be taken within sixty days from the 
date of the deficiency letter. If the sixtieth day falls on Sunday, the appeal 
may be filed on the sixty-first day.
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No. 12
Park sold certain goods to Markoe, shipping them by express and forwarding 
a negotiable bill of lading therefor to Markoe. Markoe was insolvent and while 
the goods were in transit he made an assignment of his property, including the 
bill of lading, for the benefit of his creditors. Park, on being advised of the 
facts and before the goods were delivered, exercised a right of stoppage in 
transitu by proper notice to the express company. Markoe’s assignee claimed 
the goods by reason of holding the bill of lading, maintaining that the transfer 
to him of the document ended Park’s right of stoppage in transitu. To whom 
should the goods be awarded?
Answer:
The goods should be given to Park. The assignee for the benefit of creditors 
is not a bona-fide purchaser for value; and therefore the assignment did not cut 
off Park’s right to stoppage in transitu.
No. 13
Frank, who owned an apartment house, borrowed a sum of money from 
Sloane, giving Sloane a power of attorney to collect rents of the apartment 
house and apply them to reduction of the loan until paid in full. Frank died 
before the loan was repaid. Was the power of attorney revoked by such death? 
Answer:
In general, death of the principal will revoke an agency. One exception to 
this general rule is that death of the principal will not revoke an agency which is 
coupled with an interest of the agent in the subject matter of the agency itself. 
The facts of the present case constitute such an agency coupled with an inter­
est, for the agency given is a security for the principal’s indebtedness, and his 
death will not revoke it.
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